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8(2AI); Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20060354-CA 
AARON MERWORTH, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's position seems to be that, because the trial court determined Merworth 
was not the subject of a level two detention, his appeal does not fall into the category of 
search and seizure cases referred to in State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, and 
thus, the trial court is afforded some deference. "While appellate courts do not extend 
any deference to the trial court in its application of the law to its factual findings in cases 
which involve a search and seizure, a level-one stop does not amount to a search and 
seizure." Aple. Br. at 6. 
The illogical corollary to that argument is that, if the trial court had agreed with 
Merworth's claim that he was the subject of a seizure, then on appeal the State could 
argue that Brake requires a non-deferential standard of review, thus according no 
discretion to the trial court's decision. In this appeal, however, a deferential view 
benefits the State because the State was victorious in the trial court. 
The proposition promoted by the State provides the State with a favorable standard 
of review on appeal regardless of the outcome in the trial court—a specious, although 
convenient, legal tenet for the prosecution. Clearly, this is not what the court in Brake 
intended when it ruled "[w]e abandon the standard which extended 'some deference5 to 
the application of law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in 
favor of non-deferential review." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at f 15. The issue to be decided on 
appeal is the same one presented in the trial court—whether Merworth was the subject of 
a level one consensual encounter or level two detention, and, if subjected to a level two 
detention, whether that detention was supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. This issue thus places this appeal into the category of search and seizure cases 
contemplated by Brake. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S CASES SUPPORTING DUPLICITOUS POLICE 
CONDUCT IN A LEVEL THREE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION ARE 
IRRELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
Contrary to the State's argument that Merworth "confuses an accusation with 
strategies used by police officers to render a confession to a crime," it seems the State has 
confused the issue on appeal with a number of cases dealing with custodial (level three) 
interrogations. Aple. Br. at 11. An accusation is an accusation regardless of whether it 
might also serve as a police strategy. This appeal is not about whether officers are 
allowed to employ unsavory devices in order to induce a confession. Accusations may be 
acceptable methods of inducing a confession in the setting of a level three detention 
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supported by probable cause. In a level three detention, a defendant is not free to leave, 
his detention is supported by probable cause, and he has been told, and presumably 
waived, his constitutional rights. The distinction here is that accusations are not 
acceptable in level one or level two situations unsupported by reasonable suspicion for 
the very reason that declarations by police to citizens that citizens are guilty of specific 
criminal activity make citizens feel as though they are not free to walk away from law 
enforcement. 
This is the reason the State's reliance on State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), 
is misplaced. The court in Galli addressed the question of whether defendant's 
confession, given during a level three custodial interrogation, was coerced even though 
admissible under Miranda. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 935-936. The same is true of the 
State's dependence on Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). And, in Lucero v. 
Kerbv, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998), Defendant -was advised of his 
constitutional rights before making the statements, and he initialed and signed a written 
statement and waiver of those rights." 
Finally, the State's confidence in Utah cases State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 
984 P.2d 1009 and State v. Bunting, 2002 UT App 195, 51 P.3d 37, is unwarranted for 
the same reasons. Rettenberger involved the interrogation of a defendant who was 
confined at the Davis County jail. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at T|3. In that case, the 
court examined whether the defendant's mental and emotional deficiencies, coupled with 
the duplicitous conduct by police, invalidated his confession. See id. at fflf 19-21. 
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Bunting involved the questioning of a defendant at the police station where "[a]fter 
determining that Defendant was not intoxicated, the detectives read Defendant his 
Miranda rights, which he indicated he understood and waived." Bunting, 2002 UT App 
195atf6. 
The State's use of State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 111 P.3d 808, cert, granted, 
124 P.3d 634 (Utah 2005), in support of its conclusion that Merworth was not detained 
against his will is perplexing. The court in Alverez expressly refrained from deciding 
whether the officer's actions amounted to a level-one encounter or a level-two detention. 
Id. at^|10,n.2. 
n. MERWORTH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A LEVEL TWO DETENTION 
Merworth has never claimed that his encounter with Officer Olsen was 
involuntary from the outset. Rather, Merworth claims that this encounter sharply 
escalated to a level two detention the moment Officer Olsen accused Merworth of 
specific criminal conduct. 
In determining whether an encounter rises to a level two detention, the four factors 
mentioned in State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), are not exhaustive. Those courts invited 
future courts to consider all other circumstances, for a "totality of the circumstances" 
approach, in addition to the four factors. Bean at 986. In reference to the number of 
officers present versus the number of citizens, it should be remembered that Officers 
Olsen and Florez were done talking to the three other men when Merworth and Robert 
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returned to the group. Thus, Officers Olsen and Florez devoted their attention to 
Merworth and Robert, making it two officers versus two citizens. 
As for whether Officer Olsen's actions were supported by reasonable suspicion, 
the State made no mention of reasonable suspicion in its brief, and presumably, concedes 
the point. 
CONCLUSION 
Merworth's interactions with Officer Olsen involved a level two detention. Based 
on the foregoing, this court should reverse the trial court's ruling and grant Merworth's 
motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this {0 day of October, 2006 £ 
rl„ 
jSHARLA M.^tJNRC^E " 
" Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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